Insider trading has a bad reputation and most insider transactions are uncritically labeled as unethical due, largely, to two implicit assumptions: (1) the information insiders use in their trading decisions is not publicly available; (2) insiders and outside investors react to and process publicly available information instantaneously. In this paper we revisit these two assumptions in the auto recall setting. Using a comprehensive sample of customer complaints filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, we first explore the information content of customer complaints. We find that customer complaints predict future auto recalls and their financial consequences. Further, customer complaints predict large negative abnormal stock returns during the period following the recall announcement date and are not contemporaneously associated with stock returns, suggesting that stock prices reflect the information content of customer complaints with a delay. However, the top five executives of the car manufacturers in our sample sell significantly more shares prior to the announcement of auto recalls, particularly when there are more customer complaints. Our findings suggest that the information in insider transactions is at least in part due to insiders' higher differential attentiveness to publicly available information about their own firms.
INTRODUCTION
Do insiders discover and react to publicly available information regarding the firm they manage faster than outside investors? This question is important for at least two reasons. First, answering this question in the affirmative implies that insiders enhance informational efficiency of stock prices by trading on publicly available information that outside investors fail to process in a timely manner or ignore completely until future revelation. Second, while some studies (e.g. Machan 1996, Ma and Sun 1998; Manne 1966a Manne , b, 1985 McGee 2008 McGee , 2010 Smith and Block 2016) hold the view that insider trading is not necessarily morally wrong and may contribute to the efficiency of stock prices and enhance capital allocation, the dominant view in the literature is that insider trading is unethical, lacks morality, and, thus, should be banned (Ludman 1986; Keown et al. 1985; Moore 1990; Persons 1997; Snoeyenbos and Smith 2000; Werhane 1989 Werhane , 1991 .
Both camps in the insider literature, however, make the implicit assumption that the information insiders use in their trading decisions is not available to outsiders. A second implicit assumption is that publicly available information is processed by insiders and outsiders simultaneously and impounded into stock prices instantaneously. In this paper, we revisit these assumptions and examine the differences in the timing of insiders' and outside investors' use of publicly available information. While prior research considers the information in insider transactions as evidence of insiders' use of private information for personal gain (e.g. Agrawal and Cooper 2015) , our argument suggests that insiders' informational advantage is at least in part due to their higher levels of attention devoted to publicly available information regarding the firm that they manage.
Our argument that insiders may have a higher level of attention with respect to publicly available information about their firms is motivated by the long stream of literature on limited attention (Kahneman 1973; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . A growing empirical literature in finance and accounting attributes the market underreaction to information to frictions in information processing caused by investors' limited attention. Specifically, prior research has shown that security prices incorporate publicly available information with a delay (Huberman and Regev 2001) ; investors underreact to a firm's earnings announcement when distracted by other firms' concurrent earnings announcements (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh 2009) ; and investors underreact to Friday earnings announcements consistent with weekends causing inattention (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009) . In a recent paper, Frederickson and Zolotoy (2015) show that when faced with multiple earnings announcements, investors queue the announcements based on the visibility of the firm. A direct implication of Frederickson and Zolotoy (2015) is that insiders will rank their firm higher than outsiders when processing information signals regarding their firm. Put differently, insiders will be more attentive to any piece of information about their own firms than outsiders since, from a corporate executive's perspective, their own firm is the most visible. Any material public information is, therefore, more likely to be discovered earlier by corporate executives, and in turn will shape their corporate policies and create profitable trading opportunities before other stockholders discover the same information.
One source of such publicly available information that the literature suggests is customer complaints. For example, Ittner and Larcker (1998) , Johnson and Mehra (2002) and Huang (2017) show that levels of customer satisfaction is critical to a firm's long-standing financial performance. The customer complaints and product recalls in the auto industry provide an excellent setting to examine whether insiders discover publicly available information before other investors and subsequently use this information in their trading decisions. An auto recall is typically preceded by a manufacturer and/or National Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA) investigation.
1 These investigations are triggered by the severity of the customer complaints filed with the NHTSA. We conjecture that customer complaints contain information regarding both the likelihood of a recall and its financial consequences. We further argue that if insiders are more attentive to news and events regarding their own firms than other investors, then they are more likely to use the information contained in customer complaints in their trading decisions before other investors discover the same information.
Using a comprehensive sample of customer complaints filed with NHTSA and 526 auto recalls during the 1996-2012 period, we find that the likelihood of an auto recall increases with customer complaints and that car manufacturers' stock prices incorporate the information content of customer complaints only after the report date of the recall, i.e., the date the recall decision has been conveyed to the NHTSA by the manufacturer. Specifically, we document a strong negative relation between customer complaints and the cumulative abnormal returns over the three month period after the manufacturer conveys the decision to initiate a recall campaign to the NHTSA. Our results suggest that these publicly available customer complaints contain valuerelevant information that can be used to predict future returns. More importantly, we find that the market fails to process the information contained in customer complaints in a timely manner, presenting profitable trading opportunities to those who pay closer attention to them.
1 The automotive industry is regulated by NHTSA, which was created under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 and aimed to reduce the number of motor vehicle-related injuries by increasing scrutiny over manufacturers' compliance with federal vehicle safety standards. Part of NHTSA's responsibilities is to oversee the process of vehicle recalls in the United States. See: http://www.nhtsa.gov/ for additional information.
We next examine the trading behavior of the top five corporate executives of the automakers in our sample prior to the recall date and explore whether they use the information embedded in customer complaints. We find that insiders are significant net sellers prior to the recall date, particularly when there are more complaints filed with NHTSA. Thus, insiders are aware of the information content of customer complaints, while other investors fail to process this publicly available information. Collectively, our results suggest that insider transactions are timelier than stock prices in incorporating the implications of customer complaints for future financial performance, consistent with our conjecture that insiders are more attentive than outsiders to information about their own firms.
Our results are robust to a battery of additional tests. Specifically, when a firm has two or more recalls within a 30-day window, we only use the recall with the highest severity and obtain similar results. We also repeat our analyses after eliminating recalls with moderate complaints and find either similar or stronger results. Finally, we explore whether the information in customer complaints predicts the financial severity of auto recalls. Using the potential number of cars affected in a recall as our proxy for the recall's financial severity, we find that customer complaints are indeed an important predictor of the financial burden of the auto recall.
This paper relates to several streams of research. First, we contribute to the literature on investors' limited attention. Prior studies in this literature explore how aggregate investor attention varies from one stock to another. For example, retail investors buy into attentiongrabbing stocks (Barber and Odean 2008) and stock prices underreact to earnings announcements when investors are distracted by other earnings announcements (Hirshleifer et al. 2009 ) or the upcoming weekend (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009). We contribute to this literature by exploring whether insiders and outsiders exhibit differential attention to publicly available information on a given firm.
Further, we contribute to the discussion on whether insider trading is unethical (Engelen and Liedekerke 2007; Ma and Sun 1998; Manne 1966a Manne , b, 1985 McGee 2008, Agarwal and Cooper 2015) . The literature is divided on this issue as to when and how to classify insider transactions as unethical and/or illegal (Ma and Sun 1998; McGee, 2008; Moore 1990; Smith and Block 2016) . We depart from this literature by arguing and finding evidence that a significant source of insiders' informational advantage could be publicly available information which they discover before other investors due to higher levels of attention they devote to the firm that they manage. As significant owners in their own firm, insiders seem to be performing an information discovery role akin to that performed in the investment management industry by buy-side and sell-side institutions. These institutions expend significant resources to discover material information before other investors and are celebrated for enhancing the informational efficiency of stock prices through their information discovery role.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of prior literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection methodology and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical analyses and results, and section 5 concludes with a discussion of contributions and implications of our findings.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Customer Complaints and Product Recalls
Prior studies document a significantly negative stock price reaction to product recall announcements (Chu et al. 2005; Davidson and Worrell 1992; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Pruitt and Peterson 1986) . Therefore, information that helps predict future product recalls could be critically valuable. Since the details of manufacturing processes and the quality issues of the products are largely known to the engineers and the managers of the firm but not, to the same extent, to the investors, an information asymmetry about the true quality of a product and its deficiencies is likely to exist between insiders and outsiders (Barber and Darrough 1996; Kirmani and Rao 2000) . Although firms are generally reluctant to share negative news about their products until they are required to do so, there are potential information cues that can help the public narrow the information gap. One particular source of such information is customers'
complaints about the products they use.
Prior research finds that customer complaints are a sign of dissatisfaction with a company's products (Lapré and Tsikriktsis 2006) . 2 Dissatisfaction may arise due to the violation of customers' ex-ante expectations regarding either the quality of the product or a design flaw which may put the customer at a discomfort and/or security risk. The latter is of particular concern due to legal ramifications, and complaints regarding such matters may be a potential product recall trigger. Moreover, the direct and indirect costs (i.e., loss of reputation and foregone future sales revenues) of dissatisfied consumers can be material and long-lasting for firms that do not effectively address these concerns (Ittner and Larcker 1998: Johnson and Mehra 2002) . The significant economic impact on firms arising from customer complaints is no more salient in any line of business than in the auto industry.
The prevalent level of personal auto ownership in the U.S. and the perceived heavy cost of new autos lead to exceptional levels of interaction between products, manufacturers and the consumers. Therefore, it is not surprising that the auto industry experiences more customer complaints than any other line of business, and faces the costliest product recalls than any other industry (Chen and Nguyen 2013; Ni, Flynn and Jacobs 2014) . Therefore, the announcement of an auto recall attracts wide media coverage and is often accompanied by a negative stock price reaction (Bromiley and Marcus 1989; Chu et al. 2005; Hoffer et al. 1987; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985; Pruitt and Peterson 1986) . Figure 1 depicts the auto industry's product recall process. The NHTSA routinely screens the complaints they receive from customers regarding automobiles and opens a safety defect investigation when it is likely that there is either an "unreasonable" safety-related defect or a non-compliance issue per federal requirements that would warrant a recall. When a manufacturer agrees with the agency's recommendation to recall a product they must notify the NHTSA of their recall decision within five days, and the agency creates a record of this issue.
<<Insert Figure 1 about here>> Our first objective is to examine whether customer complaints filed with the NHTSA contain significant information concerning future car recalls. We expect that customer complaints will be associated with a higher likelihood of recalls for two reasons. First, complaints will accumulate over time if the product has a serious defect. These complaints are likely to raise flags regarding the product's true quality which in turn may trigger a safety defect investigation by the NHTSA, culminating in detection of the defect by regulators. Second, each additional complaint from a different customer potentially provides another perspective concerning the issues under screening. A security issue with a product is therefore less likely to go unnoticed with a growing number of complaints. It is important to note that customer complaints filed with the NHTSA are available to the public and are updated on a daily basis.
Investors as well as the general public accordingly have access to the most up-to-date complaint data for any car model-year through the agency's website.
Although customer complaints are an important precursor to product recalls, anecdotal evidence suggests that automakers may disregard these complaints even if the underlying defect is potentially serious. For example, General Motors reportedly knew about its faulty ignition switch issue through customer complaints months before the actual recall campaign (Bennett 2014) . Honda was recently fined by the NHTSA for underreporting fatal accidents and injuries associated with its defective products (Ivory 2015) . Similarly, we find that several hundred reports filed with either the NHTSA and/or the manufacturer directly were either ignored or did not conclude with a recall decision during Toyota's unintended acceleration crisis in 2009 to 2011 (Heller and Darling 2012) . Nevertheless, customer complaints are likely to be noticed by regulators and eventually pave the way for a recall campaign given the significance and visibility of the products being manufactured and sold in the auto industry, i.e. motor vehicles. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H1: The likelihood of a recall increases with customer complaints.
Customer Complaints and Stock Returns
Most existing studies find a significantly negative stock price reaction to product recall announcements (Barber and Darrough 1996; Chen and Nguyen 2013; Davidson and Worrell 1992; Marcus et al. 1987; Pruitt and Peterson 1986) while some find no such relationship (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011) . Recall campaigns are associated with both direct and indirect costs; while the latter are driven mostly by a damage to brand name, questions raised regarding firm operations and quality control, and negative media hype (Zavyalova et al. 2012) . We argue that recall announcements preceded by a large number of customer complaints likely attract greater media coverage that exacerbates the indirect costs, such as a damage to the automaker's reputation. Customer complaints filed prior to the recall can additionally contain information concerning the direct costs (i.e., financial severity) of the recall campaign. 3 We therefore expect a negative relation between customer complaints and abnormal stock returns following the recall announcement if the market fails to pay attention to customer complaints (publicly available information) in a timely manner.
An extensive body of financial economics literature suggests that the market underreacts to information in many corporate events such as earnings announcements, analyst forecast revisions (Gleason and Lee 2003) , corporate fraud (Karpoff and Lott 1993), restatements (Palmrose et al. 2004) , and airline crashes (Borenstein and Zimmerman 1988) . One explanation often provided in the behavioral finance literature for this market underreaction to public announcements is the cognitive limitations of market agents. Market agents with limited attention will selectively attend to only certain information regarding firms due to the abundance of information pouring from all directions (Kahneman 1973). For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) find that the market reaction to a firm's earnings news decreases with the number of concurrent earnings announcements. Frederickson and Zolotoy (2015) show that investors pay greater attention to the earnings news of more visible firms when faced with multiple concurrent announcements. Moreover, recent literature shows that investor attention as measured by Google search volumes fluctuates over time (Da et al. 2011; Vlastakis and Markellos 2012) . These findings highlight market participants' cognitive limitations in processing all available relevant information.
We therefore argue that the automaker's stock will remain overpriced during the prerecall period to the extent that investors' limited attention prevents them from processing the information embedded in customer complaints. In contrast, we should find no relation between customer complaints and abnormal returns following recall announcements if the market is aware of customer complaints filed with the NHTSA and efficiently uses this information when assessing both the likelihood of a recall and its financial ramifications. However, even the most sophisticated institutional investors may be limited in their abilities to pay close attention to each of the hundreds of individual stocks they hold in their investment portfolios and may not be attentive to every piece of publicly available information (e.g. customer complaints) about a given stock. We accordingly predict a negative relation between customer complaints and abnormal stock returns following a recall announcement. Our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Customer complaints are negatively associated with abnormal stock returns during the period following a recall announcement.
Customer Complaints and Insider Trading
Our first two hypotheses predict that customer complaints contain value-relevant information and that this information is not effectively incorporated into stock prices. This clearly creates an opportunity for insiders to exploit the complaint information if they pay attention to the implications of this information. Accordingly, we conjecture that due to limited attention ( if investors fail to attend to the publicly available information embedded in customer complaints then automakers' pre-recall stock prices will be higher than warranted by fundamentals so that investors will suffer large losses following the recall campaign announcement. On the other hand, insiders are naturally more attentive to any news regarding the firm they manage.
Therefore, it is expected that insiders act strategically on the value-relevant complaint information to maximize their wealth and time their trading decisions based on the severity of the complaint information.
A large stream of insider trading literature focuses on the timing of insider activism around major corporate announcements (e.g., bankruptcy filings, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), restatements, dividends and earnings announcements) to explore whether corporate insiders exploit their time-sensitive and value-relevant information to safeguard their wealth and/or profit from these transactions. For example, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) show that insiders sell their shares prior to the bankruptcy filing dates. Ma (2001) . 1984; Givoly and Palmon 1985) . In another setting, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) and Seyhun (1990) argue that insiders engage in illegal trading activity around M&A announcements.
Finally, Agrawal and Cooper (2015) document strong insider trading activity before restatements. Overall, these findings suggest that insiders can strategically time their trades around corporate events based on the content of their time-sensitive and value-relevant information to safeguard their wealth from the possible negative impacts of these events.
While prior studies assumed that there is an information gap between managers and the public regarding these corporate announcements, we present a case where an outside generated information (i.e. customer complaints) is publicly available and could be used by outside investors to narrow this information gap before a significant corporate announcement (i.e.
product recall) occurs. The availability of complaint data that precedes the recalls limits the private information advantage of insiders. Therefore, even if managers may want to delay the disclosure of bad news to the extent possible in the hope of a turnaround or due to career concerns (Kothari et al. 2009 ) it may not always be possible to do so with the publicly available information that may potentially help predict upcoming recall announcements.
We argue that insiders' selective attention to relevant information concerning their firms' products will allow them to better evaluate the likelihood of a recall based on the severity of customer complaints. Insiders will therefore likely reduce their holdings as a strategic move to safeguard their wealth from the negative impacts of the recall to the extent that customer complaints lead insiders to believe a recall campaign is probable.
On the other hand, the SEC has passed several regulations to monitor corporate insider trading activity on non-public information (Keown et al. 1985 and Persons 1997 ) (e.g., Rule 10b-
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 4 Lately, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) established a program for informants, held top management accountable for their employees' illegal trading activities, and significantly increased criminal penalties. Garfinkel (1997) , for example, reports that, as would be expected, the frequency of insider trading activity thirty days prior to earnings announcements has been less after ITSFEA.
5
Finally, corporations enact internal policies to prevent insiders from exploiting their informational advantage at the expense of other shareholders. For example, the majority of U.S.
corporations have some sort of blackout periods during which insiders are prohibited from trading in their own company's shares (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon 2000) . Therefore, any insider trading activity concentrated around these time-sensitive periods can potentially be considered as 4 The legal consequences for violating the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 have severely increased over time. For example, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 imposed significant jail sentences and severe penalties equal to three times the amount of insider profits. 5 Insider trading regulations were also introduced in other parts of the world (see Rundfelt (1986) ).
evidence of fraudulent activity. Although the interplay of the above-mentioned two opposing views is not known a priori, we argue that the magnitude of insider trading activity (i.e., net selling) prior to a recall announcement is positively associated with the customer complaints.
H3: Abnormal insider selling prior to a recall announcement is positively associated with customer complaints.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample Selection
We begin our sample selection process by gathering all customer complaints and recall announcements during the period from 1996 to 2012 as reported on the NHTSA's website. We obtain customer complaints using the "complaints" file from the NHTSA's website. This file contains all safety-related complaints received by NHTSA since January 1, 1995 and includes detailed information on each complaint such as the manufacturer's name, vehicle make-modelyear (MMY), the date of the complaint, whether the vehicle was involved in a crash or fire, the number of persons injured or dead, and a description of the complaints reported by the customer.
During each calendar year-quarter we calculate the number of customer complaints and the number of incidents with injury, crash, fire, or death for each MMY over a one-year period. We then investigate whether these complaint measures predict the likelihood of a recall during the next quarter. We retain each MMY in our sample for a maximum of 20 years. 6 Our final sample 6 Problems with vehicles older than 20 years are less likely to be a concern since these vehicles are assumed to be near the end of their normal life cycles for most users. Some states waive inspections, and some insurance companies refuse to insure models that are older than 20 years. In a recent recall perception survey performed by the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) 61% of respondents agreed with the statement: "Recalls of older vehicles are generally less meaningful to me than recalls of newer ones." (NADA 2014 
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the recall and complaint measures.
There is a recall during approximately 1.3% of MMY-quarters. In untabulated analyses we find that 74.1% of MMYs have no recalls during our sample period, while some MMYs realized recalls during multiple quarters. The maximum number of recalls is 12 for the Ford- F150-1997 and Chevrolet-Silverado-2000.
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> Not all complaints are identical. While some complaints are associated with accidents on the roads, injuries, and sometimes even deaths, we find that others are due to trivial concerns such as mislabeled or missing placards, problems in the seat adjustment mechanisms, or a malfunctioning glovebox lock (Liu and Shankar 2015; Reilly and Hoffer 1983) . We therefore construct the following five complaint measures using the NHTSA's "complaints" file: for each MMY during a calendar quarter #INCIDENT is the number of incidents (associated with that make-model-year), #INJURED is the total number of injuries, #CRASH is the number of incidents that involved a crash, #FIRE is the number of incidents that involved a fire, and #DEATH is the total number of deaths. We also construct a summary complaint metric, If there is no complaint for a MMY then the complaint measure is set to zero for that MMY during all four quarters. Finally, we use the average of standardized complaint measures over four quarters in order to examine whether customer complaints predict the likelihood of a recall during the next quarter. We include complaints from the past four quarters in our analysis in order to allow time for both processing complaints and any investigations that may take place between complaints and recall decisions. However, in additional analyses we obtain similar results when we use the standardized complaint value during the current quarter. Panel B of Table 1 shows that all five complaint measures are positively correlated with RECALL (p < 0.001). We also find that complaint measures are positively correlated with each other (p < 0.001) with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.13 (between INCIDENT and DEATH) and
(between INJURED and CRASH).
Panel C of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables in our recall sample.
We use this sample in order to investigate whether complaints are associated with excess returns around the post-recall period (H2) and insider trading (H3) respectively. We report the US dollar value of net insider selling, VSELL, and the dollar value of abnormal net insider selling, ABVSELL, during the event period. The average VSELL is 0.279 ($279,000), indicating that the value of sell trades exceeds the value of buy trades. This is consistent with the insider trading literature suggesting that insiders mostly sell their holdings over the course of their ownership (e.g., Huddart et al. 2007 ). 8 The average abnormal net insider selling, ABVSELL, is -0.084 (-$84,000), indicating that insider net selling is lower during the event period than the control periods. However, we find that it is not significant. ,+63] ). This is consistent with our argument that complaints contain information concerning the recall's financial outcome and this information is not reflected in stock prices before the recall date. We also find that all of our complaint variables except for #SDEATH are positively correlated with abnormal net insider selling (ABVSELL). These initial univariate results therefore support our hypotheses that investors fail to react to complaint information in a timely manner (H2), and that insiders sell their shares in response to complaints prior to recall announcements (H3). We additionally find a positive correlation between all complaint measures and recall severity (LnNDEFECT) which we use as a proxy for the financial severity of recalls in our additional analyses.
RESULTS
Complaints and Likelihood of Recalls
We begin by examining whether customer complaints are associated with the likelihood of a recall (H1) by estimating the following regression model: <<Insert Table 2 about here>> The results presented in Table 2 support the hypothesis (H1) that the likelihood of a recall increases with customer complaints. We specifically find that the coefficient on each COMPLAINT measure is significantly positive at the 1% level, ranging between 1.484 for #SINCIDENT and 4.035 for FACTOR (the average of five complaint measures). Since complaint measures are standardized to range between zero and one, the coefficient on each complaint measure provides specific information regarding the complaint measure's effect on the likelihood of a recall relative to the effects of other complaint measures. We therefore find that customer complaints involving an injury, crash, fire, or death are on average more strongly associated with the likelihood of a recall than complaints without these qualities. Panel B of Table 2 reports the results for the sample restricted to MMYs from four automakers with returns and insider trading information. We find that the effect of COMPLAINTs on the likelihood of a recall strongly persists in this restricted sample as well. The coefficient on each complaint measure in the restricted sample is comparable to the coefficient on the complaint measure from the full sample, strengthening our initial finding that complaints are significantly associated (pvalue <0.01 or better) with the likelihood of a recall when incidents involve an injury, crash, fire, or death. Our findings therefore support H1.
We find strong evidence that customer complaints filed with the NHTSA do contain information concerning future car recalls. Our results suggest that automakers generally take timely legal actions in the form of recalls in response to an accumulation of customer complaints, contrary to the case with Toyota's unintended acceleration crisis during 2009 to 2011 (Heller and Darling 2012).
Complaints and Abnormal Returns after Recall Announcements
Our findings so far provide strong support for our first hypothesis that customer complaints contain value relevant information. In this section we investigate whether the market incorporates this complaint information into stock prices in a timely manner. We conjecture that if the market fails to use the information embedded in complaints and therefore becomes aware of the recall campaign's details and financial consequences only after the recall report date, then we expect to find a negative association between complaints and excess returns following the recall report date. Specifically, we examine whether complaint measures are associated with long window excess returns (three months) following the recall report date.
We estimate the following regression model:
where EXRET is the value-weighted excess returns over the three month-window beginning two days after the recall report date, CAR [+2,+63] . COMPLAINT is one of the six standardized complaint measures (#SINCIDENT, # SINJURED, # SCRASH, # SFIRE, # SDEATH, and FACTOR) ranging between zero and one for each firm. MV is measured as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, and BM is calculated as the book value of common stock (CEQQ) divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window. MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP valueweighted index returns) over the three-month period ending at the beginning of the event window. We sort MV, BM, and MOMENTUM into decile ranks separately for each firm and then standardize them to range between zero and one (i.e., DMV, DBM, and DMOMENTUM).
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> We estimate the model by including firm fixed effects and report the results for the excess returns over the three months following the recall report date in Panel A of Table 3 . We find that the coefficient on each complaint measure is significant consistent with the market becoming aware of the recall campaign and its financial costs following the recall report date.
This result is consistent with our second hypothesis, H2, which asserts that the market fails to incorporate fully the information content of complaints in a timely manner. Since our complaint measures are standardized to range between zero and one, the coefficients on the complaint measures can be interpreted as the excess returns following recalls with a complaint score of one.
For example, when the complaint measure is #INCIDENT, we find that recalls with a complaint score of one experience excess returns of -9.7% over the three-month period following the recall report date.
We next examine the short window stock price reactions to recall announcements by substituting the dependent variable in Equation (2) with the value-weighted excess returns over the three day-window around the recall report date, CAR [-1,+1] . Results are reported in Panel B
of Table 3 . The coefficients on all six complaint measures are insignificant. Together with the results reported in Panel A, the results in Panel B suggest that the initial market reaction to recalls does not reflect the information content of customer complaints and this information is incorporated only gradually into prices as more information about the financial ramifications of the recall campaign are made available to the public by the auto maker.
In untabulated analyses we also consider longer horizon (12 months) excess returns following the recall report date and find that there is both a statistically significant (at the 1% level for each complaint measure except #DEATH, which is significant at the 10% level) and economically large (more than 20%) relation between excess returns and complaint measures.
Our results suggest that a substantial amount of the information embedded in complaints is realized gradually during the period following the recall report date.
Our findings generally support the argument that the public is likely to learn the details regarding a recall and begins incorporating these implications from complaint-related information into their expectations during the period following the recall report date. These findings also suggest that insiders can use complaint information in order to assess the likelihood as well as the economic cost of an upcoming recall. If so, insiders will increase their net selling activity prior to recalls accompanied by large number of customer complaints to minimize any potential loss in their wealth due to the auto recall announcement. We explore this question in the next section.
Complaints and Insider Trading
In this section we test our third hypothesis (H3) that customer complaints are positively associated with abnormal insider selling before the recall report date. We estimate the following model:
where ABVSELL is abnormal dollar value of net insider selling over the three months ending before the recall report date. COMPLAINT is one of the six standardized complaint measures (#SINCIDENT, # SINJURED, # SCRASH, # SFIRE, # SDEATH, and FACTOR) ranging between zero and one for each firm. The other variables are defined as in the previous section.
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates for Equation (3). We find that the coefficients on each complaint measure (except DEATH) are significantly positive, indicating that insiders incorporate complaint information and significantly increase their net selling activity prior to the recall report date. For example, the first column reports the results when we measure complaints using the #SINCIDENT. We find that the coefficient on #SINCIDENT is 0.653, suggesting that abnormal net insider selling increases by approximately US $653,000 when the standardized incident measure #SINCIDENT increases from the minimum value of zero to the maximum value of one. In untabulated analyses we use a logarithm of ABVSELL and find consistent results.
We accordingly find that abnormal net insider selling is positively associated with customer complaints, supporting H3 that insiders use the information embedded in complaints in order to safeguard their wealth and minimize the forthcoming recall announcement's impact.
Robustness Tests and Additional Findings
We undertake several additional tests in order to examine the robustness of our results. In untabulated results we first find that there are some cases where we have more than one recall for a firm within a 30-day window. In these cases we use the incident with the highest recall severity, reducing our sample to 288 recalls. We repeat all analyses using the restricted sample and obtain results consistent with those reported above. Specifically, we find an even more significant association between complaints and abnormal net insider selling using the reduced sample. Second, we standardize complaint measures by creating a dummy variable for high complaints HIGHCOMPLAINT that takes value of one for complaints that are in the highest quartile of the firm's complaint measure, and zero otherwise. We obtain even stronger results using this alternative standardization procedure, suggesting a non-linear association between complaints and insider selling activity. Similarly, we repeat all analyses by eliminating recalls with moderate complaints and find either similar or even more significant results.
Third, we consider the possibility that ease of access to information regarding customer complaints may have changed over time since technological advancements in accessing information changed during our sample period. We address this potential issue by comparing the very early period of our sample (1996 to 1999) when internet access to agency databases may have been either difficult or completely unavailable with the late period (2008 to 2012). We do find that our results are stronger during the late than the early study period.
Finally, we explore whether the information in complaints predict the financial severity of recalls. We measure the severity of a recall with the number of potential cars affected in the recall, NDEFECT. The mean (median) NDEFECT is 226,208 (18,748) . The minimum NDEFECT is one for Ford-E450 in a recall reported on December 5, 2008, while the maximum NDEFECT is over 14 million for Ford's multiple make-models in a recall reported on August 26,
2008 (see Panel C of Table 1 ). In untabulated analyses we also find a negative relation (significant at the 1% level) between the logarithm of NDEFECT, Ln(DEFECT), and the threemonth excess returns over the post-recall date (i.e., EXRET). This negative relation suggests that firms experience negative excess returns, particularly following recall campaigns that involve a significant number of cars. 9 This provides support for our assumption that NDEFECT proxies for the financial severity of recalls.
10
We estimate the following model in order to explore whether customer complaints predict the economics cost of a recall:
where Ln(NDEFECT) is the logarithm of the number of cars potentially affected in the recall.
11
COMPLAINT is one of the six standardized complaint measures (#SINCIDENT, # SINJURED, # SCRASH, #SFIRE, # SDEATH, and FACTOR) as defined in Appendix. As in the previous analyses we use standardized complaint measures in order to mitigate concerns that the relation between COMPLAINT and recall severity could be driven by a firm-level omitted factor that affects both complaints and recall severity. We additionally include firm indicators in all regression models.
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 9 In untabulated additional analyses we also regress the excess returns on complaint measures after controlling for the recall severity Ln(DEFECT), and find that Ln(DEFECT) largely subsumes the relation between complaint measures and excess returns. This finding is consistent with the argument that complaints contain value-relevant information because they can be used to assess not only the likelihood but also the severity of an upcoming recall.
10 Although we assume a positive relation between a recall's severity and the number of cars affected, we also use the explanation provided from the recall data regarding the company's corrective actions. While some recalls affect a large number of cars, the corrective action required by the company suggests that the cost of the recall may not be high. In untabulated analyses we obtain our results by either removing these recalls or setting their severity to median; as expected we find stronger results. However, we report these results using NDEFECT as provided by NTHSA in order to prevent any concerns regarding possible bias introduced by our identification process.
The results in Table 5 suggest that complaints are positively associated with a recall's severity. The coefficients on these complaint measures range between 3.879 for SDEATH and 5.133 for FACTOR, and are statistically significant at the 1% level. For example, when we use SINCIDENT as our complaint measure we find that the coefficient on the standardized incidents is 4.983. This suggests that the number of cars affected will increase by 144% (Exp (4.983))
when the standardized incidents associated with a recall move from minimum value of zero to the maximum value of one. 12 This effect is lowest when the complaint measure is SDEATH at 47% (Exp (3.879)), and highest when the complaint measure is FACTOR at 167% (Exp (5.133)).
We therefore find that complaints have both statistically significant and economically large effects on the severity of recalls.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we explore whether insiders are more attentive to outside generated publicly available value relevant information concerning the firms that they manage that other stakeholders either ignore or fail to process in a timely manner. We first provide evidence that customer complaints contain material information that the market discovers with a delay.
Specifically, we find that the likelihood of an auto recall increases with the number of customer complaints filed with the NHTSA, measured as the number of customer complaints and incidents that involve injury, crash, fire, or death. Perhaps more importantly we find that stock prices incorporate the information content of customer complaints only after the recall decision has 12 The intercept is 9.084 when using standardized incidents as our complaint measure, indicating that the average number of cars affected is approximately 8,821 (Exp (9.084)) when the standardized incident is zero. The average number of cars affected will therefore be approximately 1,270,224 (144 x 8,821) when the standardized incident is one.
been conveyed to the NHTSA by the automaker. Specifically, we find a strong negative relation between customer complaints and cumulative abnormal returns over the three-month period after the decision to initiate a recall campaign has been conveyed to the NHTSA by the automaker.
We next investigate whether insiders of automakers make use of the information embedded in the customer complaints filed with the NHTSA in their trading decisions. An analysis of the trading behaviors of the top five corporate executives of the automakers in our sample prior to the recall date reveals that insiders are significant net sellers prior to the recall date, particularly when there are more customer complaints filed with the NHTSA. This suggests that insiders discover and utilize the information in customer complaints while other investors fail to process this outside generated publicly available information source. We interpret this finding as evidence that insiders are more attentive to news regarding their firms than other investors.
This paper makes several contributions. First, our results extend the empirical literature on limited attention. Prior studies propose investors' limited attention as an explanation for why stock prices reflect information with a delay (DellaVigna and Pollet 2009; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Hirshleifer et al. 2009; Huberman and Regev 2001) . Recent studies find that aggregate investor attention changes over time (Da et al. 2011; Vlastakis and Markellos 2012) and that investors assign a higher priority to the processing of earnings announcements of more visible firms (Frederickson and Zolotoy 2015) , consistent with attention being a scarce resource. In particular, are stakeholders who dedicate greater attention to a given firm more likely to discover value-relevant information and trade profitably before other investors discover the same piece of information? Our study provides a first attempt at this question by exploring the association between outside generated public information about the firms (i.e., customer complaints) and the trading behavior of corporate executives who we argue are more attentive to news concerning their firms.
Second, we add to the ongoing debate on whether insider trading is unethical. We provide empirical support for studies (e.g. Engelen and Liedekerke 2007; Manne 1966a Manne , b, 1985 McGee 2008) calling for clearly worded legislation that prevents insiders' misappropriation of capital providers while allowing non-fraudulent transactions to be completed without fear of prosecution (Machan 1996; McGee 2008) . Our analysis suggests that insiders' higher levels of attention devoted to their own firms may lead them to acquire significant informational advantages from publicly available sources which other investors discover much later. Our findings therefore question the validity of the assumption that insider trading is always unethical and suggest that at least part of the insiders' actions can be due to their differential attentiveness to their firms rather than their making unethical gains using their private information.
Moreover, while an extensive body of research examines the effects of recall announcements on outcomes such as firm value (Barber and Darrough 1996; Pruitt and Peterson 1986) , future purchase intention (Lin et al. 2011 ) sales performance (Rhee and Haunschild 2006) , and future recall likelihood (Haunschild and Rhee 2004) , to our knowledge, this is the first study examining an outside generated public information channel as an antecedent for product recalls. We show that customer complaints, which are publicly available, contain useful information that can predict both the likelihood and financial severity of recalls. Future studies can explore whether the information in customer complaints moderates the effects of recall announcements on different firm outcomes.
In conclusion, while insider trading has a bad reputation and most insider transactions are uncritically labeled as unethical, we present evidence countering this assumption. We show that insiders' actions may be -at least partly-based on publicly available information about their firms that the investment community may tend to overlook. The cognitive limitations of market participants coupled with the differential attentiveness of insiders to the outside-generated information concerning their firms create possibilities for such important information to be used profitably by insiders. While further research in different settings is warranted to explore the generalizability of our findings, our perspective in this paper present a response to recent calls in the literature on insider trading to distinguish the good from the bad in insider transactions. 
APPENDIX
#INJURED
The number of injured for a MMY during a calendar quarter.
#CRASH
The number of incidents that involved a crash for a MMY during a calendar quarter.
#FIRE
The number of incidents that involved a fire for a MMY during a calendar quarter.
#DEATH
The number of dead for a MMY during a calendar quarter.
#SINCIDENT
The standardized #INCIDENT obtained by dividing number of incidents for the MMY during a quarter by the maximum number of the incident measure for the MMY over the sample period.
#SINJURED
The standardized #INJURED obtained by dividing number of injuries for the MMY during a quarter by the maximum number of the injury measure for the MMY over the sample period.
#SCRASH
The standardized #CRASH obtained by dividing number of crashes for the MMY during a quarter by the maximum number of the crash measure for the MMY over the sample period.
#SFIRE
The standardized #FIRE obtained by dividing number of fires for the MMY during a quarter by the maximum number of the fire measure for the MMY over the sample period.
#SDEATH
The standardized #DEATH obtained by dividing number of deaths for the MMY during a quarter by the maximum number of the death measure for the MMY over the sample period.
FACTOR
The average of the five standardized complaint measures.
COMPLAINT
One of the six standardized complaint measures for the MMY obtained as of calendar quarter t.
Recall Sample (Models 2, 3, and 4) EXRET
Either the value-weighted excess returns over three days around the recall report or the value-weighted excess returns over three months beginning two days after the recall report date.
VSELL
The value of sell transactions (in million dollars) minus value of buy transactions (in million dollars) in the event period, 3 months ending before the recall report date.
ABVSELL
Abnormal dollar value of net insider selling in the event period, measured as the net insider selling in the event period minus the average net insider selling pre-event period, 3 months ending before the beginning of the event period, and post-event period, 3 months beginning on the recall date.
RDATE
The date report received by NHTSA.
NDEFECT
The number of potential cars affected in the recall.
#INCIDENT
The total number of incidents associated with the recall within one year period ending before the recall date.
#INJURED
The total number of injuries associated with the recall within one year period ending before the recall date.
#CRASH
The total number of crashes associated with the recall within one year period ending before the recall date.
#FIRE
The total number of fires associated with the recall within one year period ending before the recall date.
#DEATH
The total number of deaths associated with the recall within one year period ending before the recall date.
#SINCIDENT
The standardized #INCIDENT obtained by dividing number of incidents associated with a recall by the maximum number of incidents across all recalls for the firm in the sample period.
#SINJURED
The standardized #INJURED obtained by dividing number of injuries associated with a recall by the maximum number of injuries across all recalls for the firm in the sample period.
#SCRASH
The standardized #CRASH obtained by dividing number of crashes associated with a recall by the maximum number of crashes across all recalls for the firm in the sample period.
#SFIRE
The standardized #FIRE obtained by dividing number of fires associated with a recall by the maximum number of fires across all recalls for the firm in the sample period.
#SDEATH
The standardized #DEATH obtained by dividing number of deaths associated with a recall by the maximum number of deaths across all recalls for the firm in the sample period.
FACTOR
COMPLAINT
One of the six standardized complaint measures.
LMV
The natural logarithm of market value of equity (MV) at the beginning of the year where MV is measured as stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding at the beginning of fiscal year t end.
BM
The book-to-market ratio at the beginning of the year, measured as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity.
MOMENTUM
The cumulative market-adjusted returns over three months ending one day prior to the beginning of a given period.
FIGURE 1.
Timeline of Motor Vehicle Recall Process in the U.S. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the recall process in the U.S. automotive industry. NHTSA is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that oversees the safety recall process. When the manufacturer makes a recall decision, NHTSA concludes their investigation and they continue monitoring the effectiveness of the recall campaign. 
